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Abstract 
The relationship between the interest rate and the maturity of newly issued 
bonds provides information on the debt dynamics of an economy as well as 
on the sustainability of its debt. Such information is crucial especially for 
countries that have debt-rollover concerns due to financial stress and/or 
macroeconomic instability. This study investigates the relationship between 
treasury auction maturity, which also dictates the debt maturity, and auction 
interest rates. When the Turkish treasury auction data from 1988 to 2004 are 
analysed, a reciprocal linkage between auction interest rates and maturities 
can be observed, especially for the 1995–2000 period, when there were 
chronic high inflation, high political uncertainty, high public deficits and 
unsuccessful attempts at stabilisation. This suggests that under an adverse 
shock, the Treasury decreases the auction maturity in order not to increase 
interest rates too much. A change in this reciprocal relationship is also 
reported for the post-2001 era, which is characterised by decreasing 
inflation, higher political stability, lower public deficits and successful 
stabilisation attempts. 
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I. Introduction 
Effective public debt management is one of the most important tasks for 
economic policymakers. This is especially important in countries that have 
debt-rollover concerns due to financial stress and macroeconomic 
instability. This paper investigates the treasury auction maturity–yield 
relationship for Turkey and reveals a negative relationship between the 
auction maturity and interest rates – a downward-sloping yield curve. 
The perception of risk determines the way the risk is priced. Calvo and 
Guidotti (1990a and 1990b) and Missale and Blanchard (1994) state that a 
government’s opportunity to increase inflation is a channel through which 
perceivable risk emerges on creditors’ returns, i.e. a government can induce 
higher inflation in the medium-to-long term in order to decrease the real 
value of its debt repayments, which causes a decrease in ex-post real returns. 
Alesina, Prati and Tabellini (1990) consider the possibility of default as 
another channel. 
Regarding the effect of maturity on sustainability, it is emphasised in the 
literature that short-maturity debt must be refinanced often, which increases 
financial stress (Giavazzi and Pagano, 1990; Alesina, Prati and Tabellini, 
1990; Missale and Blanchard, 1994). Among these, Alesina et al. 
theoretically assess the management of debt when the government faces the 
possibility of a confidence crisis. They assert that optimal debt management 
requires issuing long-maturity debt, which is evenly concentrated at all 
future dates, and even at relatively higher interest rates, rather than 
concentrating on short-term only.1 
Calvo and Guidotti (1992) analyse the role of debt maturity in a 
framework of tax smoothing and time inconsistency of optimal policy.2 
Their model also suggests that a negative linkage between the maturity of a 
debt and the associated real return does exist. Drudi and Giordano (2000) 
study the default risk in a similar manner and show that long-term debt may 
not be operational when real rates are very high.3 
This paper, using the Turkish treasury auction data of the period from 
July 1988 to December 2004, reveals a statistically significant negative 
 
1In a later article, Alesina et al. (1992) investigate the default risk for indebted OECD countries and 
assert that the likelihood of default is low as long as the existing debt is rolled over at reasonable interest 
rates. There is a positive association between the likelihood of a confidence crisis and the level of debt, 
where the default premium is positively associated with the size of the debt and negatively associated 
with average maturity. 
2In Calvo and Guidotti (1992), optimality is achieved with perfect tax smoothing at zero inflation in 
the case of the government’s full precommitment to its inflation and default policies. However, in the 
absence of the government’s precommitment to its inflation and debt-repudiation policies, a negative 
linkage between the average maturity and the level of debt is achieved as a second-best solution. 
3Alesina et al. (1990) and Alesina et al. (1992) imply the conclusion of Calvo and Guidotti (1992) and 
Drudi and Giordano (2000) under different assumptions; the first two studies treat maturity as exogenous 
but the latter two treat it as endogenous. 
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relationship between treasury auction maturity and interest rates, indicating 
a negatively sloped yield curve, specifically for the pre-2001 sample. Based 
on this finding, we argue that the low credibility of policymakers regarding 
inflation commitment that is associated with macroeconomic instability and 
the default risk shortens the maturities with higher interest rates due to the 
reluctance of creditors to extend funds for the long-term financing of public 
deficits. Changes in the slope of the estimated yield curve in the post-2001 
subsample are also reported in the paper. It is worth noting that the post-
2001 period is characterised by lower deficits, lower default risk, successful 
stabilisation to decrease inflation and higher political stability. 
The Turkish economy provides a unique laboratory for studying the 
return–maturity relationship that could emerge under financial stress. First, 
the Turkish debt was able to roll over throughout history but there was 
always a non-zero default risk, as in Alesina et al. (1992). Second, the 
Turkish economy operated under chronic high and volatile inflation for 
more than three decades, which resembles the risk on real return as put forth 
by Calvo and Guidotti (1990a and 1990b) and Missale and Blanchard 
(1994). Merging these observations with the political instability of 
successive coalition governments, the ‘lack of confidence’ in economic 
policymakers can be easily comprehended.4 These observations underline 
the inherent financial stress and macroeconomic stability.  
Section II summarises a framework upon which we develop our 
empirical analysis. Section III presents our modelling approach and the 
estimates. Section IV discusses the findings and concludes the paper. 
II. Theoretical framework 
The negative association between maturity and return can be deduced for a 
utility-maximising agent with tax distortions where the government can 
issue both short- and long-term bonds and with a non-zero default risk. One 
may consider a version of Alesina, Prati and Tabellini’s (1990) model, in 
which a representative individual maximises her lifetime utility and the 
government minimises its loss function.5 
The individual derives non-negative utility from her consumption in each 
period through a regular concave utility function. In every period, she is 
endowed with one unit of non-storable output and pays a distortionary tax to 
government, where the size of the distortion is convex in the tax rate. She 
has access to perfect international capital markets in which she can borrow 
and lend at a risk-free interest rate equal to her discount factor.  
 
4Ertugrul and Selçuk (2001) give a recent history of the Turkish economy. 
5A detailed presentation of this model is available in the Appendix. One could also use a version of 
Calvo and Guidotti’s (1992) model to show the negative relationship between maturity and (real) interest 
rate. This version of the formal model is available from the authors upon request. 
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There exist short- and long-term debt instruments. Government can 
repudiate some fraction of its obligations in each period. This fraction is 
called the default parameter and assumed to be invariant between the short- 
and long-term debts. The government finances the non-repudiated part of its 
obligations by means of newly levied taxes and/or newly issued debt. Its loss 
function includes the financing cost of the existing debt and the cost of tax 
distortions. 
The government does not have any incentive to repudiate if the cost of 
repudiation is larger than the tax distortions needed for servicing the debt. 
However, this picture gets complicated when there is a non-zero repudiation 
risk. In order to illustrate this, suppose that the private expectations about 
the future fraction of repudiated debt do not depend on the history of the 
game, and that people expect full repudiation at some future date. Under 
such circumstances, the government will choose to repay only if the cost of 
repudiation exceeds the total discounted cost of future tax distortions. The 
discounted sum of tax distortions is larger in the case of a confidence crisis 
than in a no-crisis scenario. Hence, if the government’s cost of repudiation 
lies between these two figures, then there exists an equilibrium in which a 
confidence crisis may occur in the current period or earlier. Eventually, the 
discounted sum of tax distortions, which is the government’s threshold to 
pay or not to pay its existing obligations, depends on the maturity structure 
of public debt. 
The basic lesson of the Alesina et al. (1990) model is that equilibrium 
with a confidence crisis is less likely to occur if (i) only long-term debt is 
issued and (ii) the same amount of debt matures in each period. One may 
further elaborate their model to show that the maturity of debt negatively 
affects the yield of bonds. That is, if the maturity shortens, the cost of tax 
distortions becomes higher and thus the fraction of the repudiated debt 
increases. This increase, using the no-arbitrage condition, causes the bond 
price to decrease, which is equivalent to an increase in the real return on the 
bond. In a nutshell, Alesina et al. suggest that the maturity of the debt 
negatively affects the yield of bonds. [A] 
The default risk premium is also taken into consideration by Alesina et 
al. If the expected fraction of repudiated debt is non-zero in every period 
with a known probability, the government has to pay a risk premium on its 
liability to compensate for the default risk, until a confidence crisis occurs. 
Lengthening and balancing the maturity structure of government debt can 
reduce this premium. [B] 
Results [A] and [B] together imply a drop in the real yield of bonds as 
maturity lengthens, and this is empirically assessed in the next section 
employing the Turkish data. 
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III. Empirical analysis 
Based on Section II, a negative relationship between the return and maturity 
of public debt is tested empirically in this section of the paper. The evidence 
reveals a statistically significant and negative relationship between return 
and maturity, as presented in subsections III.4 and III.5. However, before 
proceeding with our estimates, we introduce our estimation strategy in order 
to (i) distinguish the properties of the auction and monthly data-sets that we 
employ as well as the variable definitions, (ii) divide the whole sample 
range into subsamples and (iii) show the estimation technique and the form 
of the specification. 
1. Data-sets and variables 
Our empirical analysis is based on two types of data covering the period 
from July 1988 to December 2004.6 The first set – auction data – is based 
on the observations for each auction and compiled from data from the 
Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey and the State Planning 
Organisation.7 The basic variables in this data-set are the nominal interest 
rate on each auction quoted monthly,8 Rauction, and the maturity of each 
auction, Mauction, measured in years.9 The real return on each auction is 
computed by deflating the nominal rate by the seasonally adjusted rate of 
wholesale price index (WPI, 1987=100) inflation, π, the rate of local 
currency depreciation, ρ, or the monthly quoted interbank interest rate, i, 
corresponding to the month in which the auction is held. The rationale for 
using these three deflators originates from the fact that inflation and 
currency depreciation affect the intertemporal allocation of resources for 
 
6Auction data are available after 1985; however, the availability of the deflating variables that are used 
in our estimations restricts the start date of the usable data-set to July 1988. Specifically, the interbank 
market has been operational only since this date. We end the data-set in December 2004, but especially 
focus on the data prior to June 2001, which corresponds to the date of a high-volume swap of treasury 
bonds with the public institutions and the public sector banks. This swap was aimed at handling the 
operational losses of various banks that were taken over by the Savings Deposits Insurance Fund (SDIF) 
following the February 2001 financial crisis. Afterwards, the denomination of the debt changed and the 
maturity was lengthened. Since the default, exchange rate and inflation risk compositions of the 
government debt changed considerably after that, the main focus of the study is on the pre-June-2001 
episode. 
7In this paper, we only include the treasury auctions in Turkish-lira-denominated bills and bonds and 
exclude foreign-exchange-denominated and inflation-indexed bills and bonds. The reason for this 
exclusion is that neither foreign-exchange-denominated nor inflation-indexed assets were traded in 
secondary markets regularly (thus these bills and bonds had high liquidity premiums) and the Treasury 
was often reluctant to issue these bills and bonds due to their exchange-rate or inflation risks for a 
significant portion of our sample span. 
8The monthly equivalent of the auction (simple) interest rate is computed by dividing the per-annum 
figure by 12. The official convention for reporting auction interest rates is to report the simple, rather 
than compound, figures. We follow the same convention in this study as well. 
9Following Grabbe (1996), we took one year to be 360 calendar days. 
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domestic agents and the real return on domestic bonds for foreign investors. 
Similarly, the interbank interest rate is taken as a benchmark by domestic 
investors when they bid for treasury auctions. The rate of depreciation is 
computed as the percentage change in the Turkish lira value of a currency 
basket that is composed of 1 US dollar and 0.77 euro (prior to the 
circulation of euro, 1 US dollar and 1.5 Deutsche mark), which is the 
official exchange-rate basket that the Central Bank of the Republic of 
Turkey follows for its operations. 
The deflated (real) auction interest rates that are used in this paper are as 
follows. The real interest rate, auctionr
π , is defined as )1/()( ππ +−auctionR . 
1
auctionr
π −  is defined as )1/()( 11 −− +− ππ
auctionR  where π–1 is the previous 
month’s rate of inflation, and it is used as an instrumental variable. When ρ 
and i, instead of π, are used to obtain the real interest-rate measures,10 the 
resulting real interest rates are denoted as auctionr
ρ  and iauctionr  respectively. We 
have also defined 1auctionr
ρ−  and 1iauctionr
−  for 1auctionr
π − , where the first two are the 
notational convention for the last one, but the depreciation and interbank 
rate were used rather than inflation. 
The auction data-set does not have a regular periodicity; therefore, 
inferences from the auction data might be subject to criticisms such as (i) 
the auction-based data-set that we employ is not adequately balanced (for 
example, there are some months with no treasury auctions), (ii) the 
frequency of auctions in different months is not necessarily the same11 and 
(iii) the volume of borrowing is not the same for every single auction. In 
order to handle these potential criticisms, we estimate the interest-rate–
maturity relationship by using monthly data. The nominal interest rate 
quoted monthly and the monthly average maturity are denoted by Rt and Mt 
respectively. Explicitly, Rt is the monthly interest rate on treasury auctions, 
calculated for each month as a weighted average of the interest rates of the 
treasury auctions held in that particular month, where the weights are chosen 
 
10The reader will realise that our choice of deflators, when obtaining the real interest-rate measures, 
stems from three important economic constructs, such that the choices of the seasonally adjusted rate of 
WPI inflation, the rate of currency depreciation and the interbank overnight interest rate are linked with 
the Fisher equation, the uncovered interest rate parity condition and a more general financing condition 
respectively. The Fisher equation relates nominal interest rates to the inflation rate. In its strong form, 
there is a one-for-one relationship between these rates; thus the real interest rate is constant. The 
uncovered interest rate parity condition suggests that the interest-rate difference between domestic and 
foreign countries is a function of depreciation. One may assume that the domestic interest rate is 
determined by depreciation if the domestic interest rates are considerably higher and more volatile than 
foreign interest rates. Lastly, the financing condition dictates the long-term rates as a function of short-
term rates due to the Expectation Theory of the Term Structure of Interest Rates. 
11Owing to this imbalance, rate of inflation, rate of currency depreciation and interbank interest rates 
may be overemphasised for months with more treasury auctions and simply be ignored for months with 
no treasury auctions. 
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as the volume of borrowing in each auction. Similarly, the maturity figures 
are obtained as averages from the original auction data. For the other 
variables, such as the rate of seasonally adjusted WPI inflation and the rate 
of currency depreciation, the usual conventions are followed. The interbank 
interest rate figures are taken from the Central Bank of the Republic of 
Turkey, quoted annually. In addition, πt, ρt and it are the monthly 
counterparts of π, ρ and i of the auction data-set. Then our real-return 
measures in the monthly data-set are tr
π , tr
ρ  and itr , standing for the 
monthly nominal interest rate deflated by the monthly rate of inflation, the 
monthly rate of currency depreciation and the monthly quoted interbank 
interest rate respectively. In the case of tr
π , the formula ( ) /(1 )t t tR π π− +  is 
used to deflate the nominal interest rate. For tr
ρ  and itr , the depreciation 
rate and the interbank interest rate are employed as deflators, instead of the 
monthly inflation rate. Mt is the maturity measured in years. 
2. Choice of sample periods and descriptive statistics of data 
The whole sample of our analysis covers the period from July 1988 to 
December 2004. However, the Turkish economy experienced two severe 
financial crises within this period, which may alter the quality of empirical 
analysis. This makes us re-generate our estimates for some subsamples to 
ensure stability. Indeed, we have performed the Chow breakpoint tests in 
order to assess the robustness of our specifications between these crises. 
These tests give support to the segmentation of the sample span as presented 
in this subsection. 
The first big crisis in recent Turkish economic history – namely, the 
1994 crisis – started in January 1994 and led to the announcement of a new 
stabilisation programme in April 1994, and its devastating effects did not 
disappear until 1995. The second crisis, which was even more devastating, 
occurred in February 2001. However, the vulnerability of the Turkish 
economy had increased considerably before that – namely, in November 
2000 after the financial collapse of a medium-sized commercial bank.12 In 
May 2001, the 2001 macroeconomic stabilisation programme, which was 
also supported by the International Monetary Fund (IMF), was introduced. 
Given the availability of data and the crisis experience of the Turkish 
economy, we have designated our subsamples as [1] July 1988 to May 2001, 
[2] January 1995 to October 2000 and [3] June 2001 to December 2004. The 
episode from July 1988 to May 2001 runs from the beginning of our data to 
the start of the 2001 macroeconomic stabilisation programme. However, it 
 
12The management of that bank was taken over by the Savings Deposits Insurance Fund (SDIF). 
Although there had been other takeovers before November 2000, they did not create a severe impact. 
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includes both the 1994 and the 2001 financial crises; therefore it is likely 
that the estimated econometric relationship is subject to change within the 
episode. The January 1995 to October 2000 period allows us to avoid the 
effects of the above-mentioned crises on our estimates. The third subsample 
covers the part of the data-set from June 2001; thus it includes no crisis 
effects and reflects the developments in the last three years, which helped 
reduce financial stress and enhance macroeconomic stability (Central Bank 
of the Republic of Turkey, 2004 and 2005). 
In sum, the first subsample corresponds to a period dominated by 
financial stress and crises; the second subsample can be marked as a 
between-crises period that is still subject to high financial stress; and the last 
subsample is characterised by successful stabilisation efforts. 
Table 1 (auction data) and Table 2 (monthly data) report the descriptive 
statistics of the data for the whole and the subsample periods. Sample means 
and the standard deviations suggest that the level and variability of the 
interest rates (the auction as well as its deflated measures) have almost 
always been high for our samples, especially for the whole sample and 
subsample [1].  
Among descriptive statistics, Jarque–Bera (1987) test statistics might 
deserve special attention. Tables 1 and 2 suggest that the majority of the 
variables display normal distributions in subsamples [2] and [3], but not in 
the whole sample or in subsample [1]. Indeed, excess kurtosis (i.e. kurtosis 
above a value of 3) is observed for most of our series in the whole sample 
and in subsample [1]. For these sample ranges, we can hardly talk about the 
normality of our data. However, in subsamples [2] and [3], the data-set 
displays normality with only minor exceptions. 
Non-normality of some of the variables is also reported in earlier 
empirical evidence on Turkey. For example, Berument and Gunay (2003) 
report the ARCH effect13 in the exchange rate and Berument and Malatyali 
(2001) report the ARCH effect in inflation. Aydin (2004) studies the 
variants of ARCH models on interest rates and suggests the existence of 
significant ARCH effects. Since we employ these variables in our study, 
ARCH effects are expected in our deflated measures of the real return, 
simply ruling out the normality of series. However, the incorporation of 
ARCH effects into our investigation of the yield curve is left for further 
studies. 
 
13ARCH stands for AutoRegressive Conditional Heteroscedasticity and measures the volatility and 
risks in terms of the dynamics of the conditional variance of returns over time. Failing to reject the 
existence of ARCH effects within a series is an indication of heteroscedasticity in that series. 
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TABLE 1 




ρ  iauctionr  R π ρ i M
auction 
 Whole sample: Jul 1988–Dec 2004 auctions 
Mean 0.0221 0.0291 0.0069 0.0612 0.0385 0.0326 0.0546 0.6591 
Median 0.0198 0.0268 0.0082 0.0590 0.0364 0.0336 0.0519 0.5056 
Max. 0.1179 0.2345 0.1141 0.1872 0.2677 0.4445 0.3633 3.0417 
Min. –0.1389 –0.2443 –0.2316 0.0090 –0.0061 –0.0726 0.0159 0.0778 
Std dev. 0.0231 0.0420 0.0262 0.0249 0.0235 0.0436 0.0365 0.4528 
Skewness –0.1267 0.0205 –3.0976 0.7225 2.6758 2.5376 4.5024 1.9923 



















n 824 824 824 824 824 824 824 824 
 Subsample [1]: Jul 1988–May 2001 auctions 
Mean 0.0227 0.0282 0.0070 0.0672 0.0438 0.0392 0.0606 0.6538 
Median 0.0205 0.0255 0.0088 0.0636 0.0406 0.0362 0.0550 0.5056 
Max. 0.1179 0.2345 0.1141 0.1872 0.2677 0.4445 0.3633 3.0417 
Min. –0.1389 –0.2443 –0.2316 0.0235 –0.0003 –0.0726 0.0180 0.0778 
Std dev. 0.0248 0.0403 0.0294 0.0237 0.0225 0.0401 0.0389 0.4597 
Skewness –0.1857 0.0865 –2.8006 0.8463 3.6490 4.1172 4.4317 2.1971 



















n 641 641 641 641 641 641 641 641 
 Subsample [2]: Jan 1995–Oct 2000 auctions 
Mean 0.0340 0.0362 0.0177 0.0765 0.0412 0.0390 0.0578 0.7580 
Median 0.0329 0.0355 0.0167 0.0805 0.0418 0.0403 0.0613 0.5833 
Max. 0.1094 0.0869 0.0563 0.1257 0.0700 0.0836 0.0886 3.0333 
Min. –0.0012 –0.0038 –0.0082 0.0235 0.0088 0.0046 0.0216 0.1389 
Std dev. 0.0196 0.0173 0.0130 0.0219 0.0140 0.0158 0.0128 0.5390 
Skewness 0.5746 0.2210 0.2716 –0.7831 0.0375 0.0980 –0.7804 2.0333 



















n 217 217 217 217 217 217 217 217 
 Subsample [3]: Jun 2001–Dec 2004 auctions 
Mean 0.0197 0.0324 0.0066 0.0402 0.0202 0.0095 0.0334 0.6774 
Median 0.0176 0.0406 0.0053 0.0429 0.0157 –0.0048 0.0367 0.5444 
Max. 0.0617 0.1295 0.0253 0.0735 0.0594 0.1094 0.0543 2.0222 
Min. –0.0476 –0.0748 –0.0382 0.0090 –0.0061 –0.0600 0.0159 0.2333 
Std dev. 0.0159 0.0474 0.0067 0.0160 0.0166 0.0473 0.0120 0.4283 
Skewness 0.0647 –0.1809 –0.8938 –0.0246 0.6705 0.6579 –0.0005 1.1141 



















n 183 183 183 183 183 183 183 183 
ap-values of Jarque–Bera tests are reported in parentheses. 





© Institute for Fiscal Studies, 2005 
TABLE 2 




ρ  itr  Rt πt ρt it Mt 
 Whole sample: Jul 1988–Dec 2004 
Mean 0.0226 0.0267 0.0072 0.0616 0.0384 0.0355 0.0548 0.7359 
Median 0.0224 0.0287 0.0089 0.0606 0.0361 0.0344 0.0524 0.6962 
Max. 0.0899 0.2036 0.0862 0.1350 0.2677 0.4445 0.3633 2.0278 
Min. –0.1284 –0.2350 –0.2200 0.0190 –0.0061 –0.0726 0.0159 0.1231 
Std dev. 0.0226 0.0395 0.0273 0.0240 0.0257 0.0486 0.0377 0.3432 
Skewness –1.2090 –1.3670 –4.3322 0.3030 3.8165 3.6935 5.0230 1.5286 



















n 198 198 198 198 198 198 198 198 
 Subsample [1]: Jul 1988–May 2001 
Mean 0.0236 0.0253 0.0074 0.0676 0.0434 0.0428 0.0608 0.7438 
Median 0.0236 0.0277 0.0111 0.0675 0.0402 0.0382 0.0556 0.6825 
Max. 0.0899 0.2036 0.0862 0.1350 0.2677 0.4445 0.3633 2.0278 
Min. –0.1284 –0.2350 –0.2200 0.0275 –0.0003 –0.0726 0.0180 0.1231 
Std dev. 0.0244 0.0379 0.0308 0.0225 0.0255 0.0468 0.0401 0.3704 
Skewness –1.3197 –1.9733 –3.8953 0.2918 4.7055 5.1445 4.9608 1.5150 



















n 155 155 155 155 155 155 155 155 
 Subsample [2]: Jan 1995–Oct 2000 
Mean 0.0337 0.0361 0.0183 0.0765 0.0415 0.0390 0.0571 0.8855 
Median 0.0344 0.0368 0.0189 0.0813 0.0410 0.0419 0.0601 0.8000 
Max. 0.0770 0.0680 0.0495 0.1142 0.0700 0.0836 0.0886 2.0278 
Min. –0.0214 –0.0048 –0.0118 0.0275 0.0088 0.0046 0.0216 0.2389 
Std dev. 0.0193 0.0166 0.0130 0.0222 0.0142 0.0154 0.0125 0.4699 
Skewness –0.0452 –0.2376 –0.1293 –0.9708 0.0524 –0.0623 –0.8550 0.9282 



















n 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 
 Subsample [3]: Jun 2001–Dec 2004 
Mean 0.0191 0.0321 0.0064 0.0399 0.0205 0.0094 0.0333 0.7074 
Median 0.0175 0.0404 0.0056 0.0441 0.0157 –0.0048 0.0367 0.7222 
Max. 0.0544 0.1215 0.0196 0.0642 0.0594 0.1094 0.0543 1.2028 
Min. –0.0133 –0.0730 –0.0004 0.0190 –0.0061 –0.0600 0.0159 0.3306 
Std dev. 0.0137 0.0449 0.0049 0.0155 0.0170 0.0463 0.0124 0.2200 
Skewness 0.3544 –0.1168 1.0167 –0.1221 0.5987 0.6608 0.0489 –0.0006 



















n 43 43 43 43 43 43 43 43 
ap-values of Jarque–Bera tests are reported in parentheses. 
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FIGURE 1 
Evolution of the series: auction data 
a. Auction interest rate, nominal 
(Rauction) 




c. Auction interest rate deflated by 
seasonally adjusted rate of WPI inflation
( auctionr
π ) 
d. Auction interest rate deflated by 






e. Auction interest rate deflated by 
interbank interest rate 
( iauctionr ) 





Figure 1 continues on next page 
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FIGURE 1 continued 
g. Depreciation rate of official currency 
basket 
(ρ) 




Notes: In all panels, the horizontal axis shows the observation numbers. Maturity is measured in 360-day 
years and other variables are displayed in decimals. 
FIGURE 2 
Evolution of the series: monthly data 
a. Nominal weighted average auction 
interest rate  
(Rt) 




c. Interest rate deflated by seasonally 
adjusted rate of WPI inflation 
( tr
π ) 
d. Interest rate deflated by depreciation 
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FIGURE 2 continued 
e. Interest rate deflated by interbank 
interest rate 
( itr ) 





g. Depreciation rate of official currency 
basket 
(ρt) 




Notes: In all panels, the horizontal axis shows time periods (months). Maturity is measured in 360-day 
years and other variables are displayed in decimals. 
FIGURE 3 
Evolution of the first differences of the series: auction data 
a. Auction interest rate, nominal 
(Rauction) 
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FIGURE 3 continued 
c. Auction interest rate deflated by 
seasonally adjusted rate of WPI inflation
( auctionr
π ) 
d. Auction interest rate deflated by 






e. Auction interest rate deflated by 
interbank interest rate 
( iauctionr ) 





g. Depreciation rate of official currency 
basket 
(ρ) 




Notes: In all panels, the horizontal axis shows the observation numbers. Maturity is measured in 360-day 
years and other variables are displayed in decimals. 
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FIGURE 4 
Evolution of the first differences of the series: monthly data 
a. Nominal weighted average auction 
interest rate  
(Rt) 




c. Interest rate deflated by seasonally 
adjusted rate of WPI inflation 
( tr
π ) 
d. Interest rate deflated by depreciation 





e. Interest rate deflated by interbank 
interest rate 
( itr ) 





Figure 4 continues on next page 
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FIGURE 4 continued 
g. Depreciation rate of official currency 
basket 
(ρt) 




Notes: In all panels, the horizontal axis shows time periods (months). Maturity is measured in 360-day 
years and other variables are displayed in decimals. 
 
The levels of the data series and their differences are plotted in Figures 1 
and 2 and Figures 3 and 4 respectively. Figures 1 and 2 clearly reflect the 
trends in the data series and display the effects of the financial crises on our 
variables. It can be noted that none of the series demonstrates explosive 
behaviour. Figures 3 and 4 also demonstrate the time-changing variability of 
the series.  
3. Estimation technique and form of estimating equation 
A problem of simultaneity is inherent in the data due to the very nature of 
the treasury auction process, which determines the maturities and interest 
rates simultaneously. Under these circumstances, the ordinary least squares 
(OLS) estimates will be biased. The instrumental variable (or two-stage 
regression) (IV) technique was used to account for this problem in obtaining 
our parameter estimates. 
The first equation form that we investigate is given in equation 1: 
(1) 0 1Real Return Maturityα α ε= + +  
where Real Return, which is (Nominal Return – X)/(1+X), is obtained as 
described in subsection III.1 and Maturity is measured in years. X is a 
deflating variable, such as the rate of inflation, the depreciation rate of the 
local currency or the interbank interest rate. This form simply helps us to 
obtain the relationship between real interest rates and maturity. 
On the other hand, it is probable that deflating variables, such as rate of 
inflation, rate of currency depreciation and interbank interest rate, do not 
affect the real returns in a one-for-one manner, i.e. as in the numerator of the 
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Real Return expression in equation 1. Therefore we have also employed a 
second equation form, in which the deflating variables might have 
coefficients other than unity. This relaxation is expressed by means of 
equation 2: 
(2) 0 1 2Nominal Return Maturity Xα α α ε= + + +  
where Nominal Return is the nominal interest rate. Equations 1 and 2 are the 
generic equations that assess the basis for our analysis in the following 
subsections, where the latter is motivated by Tobin (1965). This suggests 
that nominal interest rates increase less than the amount by which inflation 
increases, under the assumption that money and capital are the only forms of 
wealth and the economy has a decreasing-returns-to-scale production 
function. Under these circumstances, if the opportunity cost of holding 
money increases due to higher inflation, then money holdings decrease and 
capital stock increases. The assumption of decreasing returns to scale causes 
the interest rate to increase less than inflation; therefore α2 becomes less 
than unity. Regarding how α2 can be less than unity in the case of X being 
the interbank interest rate, one might see Cook and Hahn (1989) and 
Berument and Froyen (2005) for empirical support. Finally, in the case of 
local currency depreciation, the deflating effect of depreciation can be 
disproportionate due to the dynamic effects of risk premiums (see Central 
Bank of the Republic of Turkey (2003)). 
When estimating equations 1 and 2 for different subsamples, the 
reliability of the estimates is a key consideration. Although the IV technique 
grants that the estimated coefficients are unbiased, the significance of the 
estimates may be mismeasured if we do not use robust standard errors. In 
order to avoid such a shortfall, we have employed the Newey–West 
procedure for non-spherical robust disturbances. 
In the next subsection, we present our analysis based on auction data and 
equation 1. Subsection III.5 presents our results on monthly data under 
equations 1 and 2. 
4. Estimates based on auction data 
Estimated coefficients based on the auction data for the return–maturity 
relationship are reported in Table 3. In the first column, our dependent 
variable is auctionr
π , which is regressed on a constant term and bond maturity. 
The instrumental variables are the constant term, the first three lags of 1auctionr
π −  
and the lag of Mauction. In the second and third columns, auctionr
ρ  and iauctionr  are 
used as the left-hand-side variables. When the nominal interest rates are  
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TABLE 3 






























































Note: t-statistics are reported in parentheses under the corresponding estimated parameters, where the 
underlying standard errors are (White’s) heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors. *, ** and *** 
correspond to statistical significance at the 10 per cent, 5 per cent and 1 per cent levels respectively. 
 
deflated with the depreciation rate or the interbank rate, the instrument sets 
are modified accordingly. That is, 1auctionr
ρ−  and 1iauctionr
−  are used as instruments 
when auctionr
ρ  and iauctionr  are used as the dependent variables. 
Table 3 suggests – for the whole sample – that there is a statistically 
significant14 and negative relationship between real interest rates on auctions 
and the maturities of newly issued debt, as we hypothesised before. 
Moreover, the largest coefficient in absolute value is observed when the 
interest rate is deflated with the depreciation rate. The same observation is 
valid for subsample [1] – namely, for auctions between July 1988 and May 
2001 inclusive. When the focus is shifted to the between-crises episode 
(subsample [2]), maturity remains statistically significant with a negative 
sign. Furthermore, it possesses the largest absolute coefficient when the 
nominal interest rate is deflated by the rate of inflation. 
The post-May-2001 subsample displays a different overall picture of the 
yield curve. When the nominal interest rate is deflated by the inflation rate 
or rate of currency depreciation, the slope of the estimated yield curve turns 
 
14The level of significance is 5 per cent unless otherwise mentioned. 
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out to be positive, although these estimates of the slope are not statistically 
significant at the 10 per cent level. This is possibly due to the change in the 
exchange-rate regime. Although the exchange rate was a useful indicator of 
expected inflation before the 2001 financial crisis, it is not so after February 
2001, when the exchange rate was allowed to float freely. 
It is worth noting that the slope of the yield curve remains negative and 
statistically significant for the post-May-2001 subsample when we compute 
the real auction return in excess of the interbank interest rate. This possibly 
reflects the change in people’s perception of the economic dynamics after 
May 2001. 
The above-mentioned change from pre-June-2001 to post-May-2001 
episode is worth further elaboration. In the absence of a confidence crisis, an 
upward-sloping yield curve is associated with expectations of ‘increasing 
inflation’, i.e. investors require higher nominal returns if they believe that 
the future course of inflation will trend upwards. However, the presence of a 
confidence crisis (for example, low confidence) reverses this picture, as 
elaborated in Section II. That is, there is no period before 2001 during which 
inflation continuously falls, and this should normally imply an upward-
sloping yield curve. However, the risk profile of the Turkish-lira-
denominated domestic debt causes the slope to be downwards, rather than 
upwards, in the pre-June-2001 episode. 
In the post-May-2001 episode, both actual consumer price inflation and 
inflation expectations have been steadily falling. This is clearly a textbook 
case of a downward-sloping yield curve. Our empirical estimates, however, 
reveal the opposite, probably indicating the continuation of the high risk 
profile of the Treasury. 
5. Estimates based on monthly data 
Our auction-based estimates depict a negative linkage between the interest 
rate of government auctions and auction maturity, confirming our theoretical 
finding in Section II for the pre-June-2001 period. This subsection provides 
evidence from the monthly data. Due to the lack of treasury auctions in 
December 1999 and December 2000, there are two missing values in the 
maturity series. The State Planning Organisation provided observations for 
those months by substituting information on the Treasury’s sale of bonds to 
public institutions. This anomaly of data is handled by defining intercept 
dummy variables for each of the two months. These dummy variables are 
included in both the functional specification and the set of instrumental 
variables, so as to control for the effect of missing observations. 
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TABLE 4 




























































































Notes: t-statistics are reported in parentheses under the corresponding estimated parameters, where the 
underlying standard errors are (White’s) heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors. *, ** and *** 
correspond to statistical significance at the 10 per cent, 5 per cent and 1 per cent levels respectively. 
D0012 is not usable in subsample [2], and neither D9912 nor D0012 is usable in subsample [3], to avoid 
singularity. 
 
In our first series of regressions, we use tr
π , tr
ρ  and itr  as the left-hand-
side variables. The regressors are the constant term, maturity Mt and the 
dummy variables for December 1999 (D9912) and December 2000 (D0012). 
We use the constant term, the two dummy variables and one to four lags of 
it, πt and ρt as our instrumental variables. The estimates in Table 4 suggest – 
for the whole sample – a negative relationship between real bond return and 
maturity, supporting our previous findings in the auction-based regressions. 
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When the nominal interest rate is deflated with the inflation rate, the slope 
estimate of the yield curve is significant at 1 per cent; when it is deflated by 
the interbank interest rate, the significance is at the 10 per cent level. 
Although the yield curve has a negative slope for tr
ρ , this estimate is 
insignificant. Table 4 further replicates these estimations for our three 
subsamples. In subsample [1], we observe a significantly negative slope 
estimate in the first column only. The real interest rate computed using the 
depreciation rate or the interbank interest rate does not have a statistically 
significant association with maturity in subsample [1]. 
Estimates for subsample [2] suggest a negatively sloped yield curve, 
regardless of the deflating variable. All these estimates are statistically 
significant at the 1 per cent level. The insignificance disappears when the 
crises are excluded from subsample [1]. This is mainly due to the fact that 
during the crisis episodes, the series under consideration display erratic 
behaviour and act as outliers. 
The last panel of Table 4 closely mimics that of Table 3, i.e. the 
estimated yield curves attain positive but insignificant slopes when inflation 
or depreciation rates are used as deflators in subsample [3], while the case 
of the interbank interest rate still suggests a negatively sloped yield curve 
after May 2001. 
One may be sceptical of the regressions presented in Table 4 since a 
coefficient of unity is imposed on the deflating variable in each of the 
regressions. Following Tobin (1965), Cook and Hahn (1989) and inflation-
risk-premium arguments that a change in the deflating variables may not be 
reflected in the nominal interest rate on a one-for-one basis,15 we estimate 
another set of regressions in which the monthly nominal interest rate, Rt, is 
regressed on the constant term, Mt, D9912, D0012 and either πt, ρt or it, and 
where the set of instrumental variables consists of the constant term, the two 
dummy variables and one to three lags of πt, ρt and it. Our IV estimates of 
these specifications are reported in Table 5, which suggests the previously 
observed negative relationship between interest rates and maturity variables 
with tighter levels of significance.16 However, there are some changes in the 
pattern of slope estimates across subsamples and across deflating variables. 
For instance, the whole sample suggests significantly negative estimates in 
all three specifications. In contrast to what we have observed in Table 4, in 
Table 5 these significant and negative estimates are maintained in 
subsample [1]. Moreover, subsamples [2] and [3] also suggest negatively 
sloped yield curves for all specifications except for the third in subsample 
[2]. In sum, the overall picture suggests a negatively sloping yield curve. 
 
15See Berument and Malatyali (2001) for elaboration on this for Turkey. 
16The same estimation could not be performed for the specifications in the previous subsection due to 
the structure of the auction data-set. 
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TABLE 5 
Nominal interest-rate–maturity relationships: monthly data 
Independent 
variables 
Rt Rt Rt 




























ρt  0.161* 
(1.909) 
 
it   0.387*** 
(4.153) 




























ρt  0.125*** 
(2.057) 
 
it   0.331*** 
(5.193) 






















ρt  0.831*** 
(2.672) 
 
it   1.436*** 
(4.297) 
Continues on next page 
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TABLE 5 continued 
Independent 
variables 
Rt Rt Rt 
















ρt  –0.231* 
(–1.836) 
 
it   1.019*** 
(12.248) 
Notes: t-statistics are reported in parentheses under the corresponding estimated parameters, where the 
underlying standard errors are (White’s) heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors. *, ** and *** 
correspond to statistical significance at the 10 per cent, 5 per cent and 1 per cent levels respectively. 
D0012 is not usable in subsample [2], and neither D9912 nor D0012 is usable in subsample [3], to avoid 
singularity. 
 
Due to the persistence of the variables of concern, there might be a 
problem of serial correlation in our estimates. Lagged values of the 
dependent variable have not been included in either Table 4 or Table 5. This 
kind of specification may raise suspicion about the robustness of the results. 
For instance, if real interest rates and maturity are both serially correlated 
variables, estimating an equation without a lagged dependent variable, or 
without correction for serial correlation, may make the maturity variable 
statistically significant only because it is a proxy for the lagged dependent 
variable or the serial correlation correction.17 Consequently, we have re-
generated our specifications in Tables 4 and 5 by adding three lagged values 
of dependent and, in the case of the nominal-interest-rate regressions, 
deflating variables as regressors.18 Tables 6 and 7 are the counterparts of 
Tables 4 and 5 respectively.19 
 
17See Hamilton (1994, pages 557–62) for a discussion of these issues.  
18The choice of three lags is due to the frequency of the financial statements prepared for the majority 
of financial institutions in Turkey. The basic results were robust for a set of alternative lag structures. 
19We have also performed the Ljung–Box (1978) tests (up to six lags) and could reject the null 
hypothesis of no autocorrelation for all specifications reported in Tables 4 and 5 (not reported in the 
paper). 
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TABLE 6 
Real interest-rate–maturity relationships: monthly data 
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TABLE 7 
Nominal interest-rate–maturity relationships: monthly data 
 Whole sample: Jul 1988–Dec 2004 Subsample [1]: Jul 1988–May 2001 Subsample [2]: Jan 1995–Oct 2000 Subsample [3]: Jun 2001–Dec 2004 
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TABLE 7 continued 
 Whole sample: Jul 1988–Dec 2004 Subsample [1]: Jul 1988–May 2001 Subsample [2]: Jan 1995–Oct 2000 Subsample [3]: Jun 2001–Dec 2004 

































































































































































Notes: t-statistics are reported in parentheses under the corresponding estimated parameters, where the underlying standard errors are (White’s) heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors. 
*, ** and *** correspond to statistical significance at the 10 per cent, 5 per cent and 1 per cent levels respectively. D0012 is not usable in subsample [2], and neither D9912 nor D0012 is 
usable in subsample [3], to avoid singularity. 
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Notes to Table 6: t-statistics are reported in parentheses under the corresponding estimated parameters, 
where the underlying standard errors are (White’s) heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors. *, ** 
and *** correspond to statistical significance at the 10 per cent, 5 per cent and 1 per cent levels 
respectively. D0012 is not usable in subsample [2], and neither D9912 nor D0012 is usable in subsample 
[3], to avoid singularity. 
 
The estimates of Table 6 suggest the same negative relationship between 
maturity and real interest rates. However, the level of statistical significance 
has dropped considerably. For the whole sample, maturity has negative 
coefficients in all cases, but they are not statistically significant. In 
subsample [1], the coefficient of maturity is negative and significant only 
for tr
π . For tr
ρ  and itr , it is negative as well, but not statistically significant. 
Subsample [2] suggests a similar pattern of estimates, although the slope of 
the yield curve is smaller in magnitude. In the last subsample, for tr
π  and 
tr
ρ , the coefficient of maturity turns positive, but these positive estimates 
are not statistically significant; for itr , the maturity variable has a negative 
and significant coefficient estimate, implying a negatively sloped yield 
curve. 
Similar to the relationship between Table 6 and Table 4, Table 7 verifies 
the findings of Table 5. Indeed, inclusion of the lagged dependent variable 
as a regressor remedied the residuals’ autocorrelation problem in practically 
all the specifications and subsamples, without altering the key findings.20 
Although the aforementioned non-normality of data in the whole sample and 
in subsample [1] affected the normality of the residuals in the estimations 
for these sample episodes, it did not change the quality of our findings.21 
As mentioned previously, we have also assessed the robustness of our 
specifications to the existence of the financial crises in our sample span. The 
Chow test statistics, which are presented in Table 8, provide support for our 
segmentation of the whole sample into subsamples. 
All in all, the negative linkage between interest rates and maturity that 
we have revealed using auction data, presented in Table 3, remained intact 
despite changes in the data structure – i.e. using monthly data instead of 
auction data – and despite different specifications – i.e. specifications that 
include, versus those that do not include, the lagged values of the dependent 
variable as right-hand-side variables. However, the signs and significance 
levels of our parameter estimates do differ in the pre-June-2001 and post-
May-2001 samples. 
The findings for the pre-June-2001 subsamples are in line with our 
elaboration and interpretation of Alesina, Prati and Tabellini (1990), the 
model that is presented in Section II, as well as Giavazzi and Pagano (1990), 
 
20Based on the Ljung–Box (1978) tests (not reported). 
21Based on Jarque–Bera (1987) tests (not reported). 
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Alesina et al. (1992), Calvo and Guidotti (1992) and Missale and Blanchard 
(1994). 
TABLE 8 
Chow breakpoint tests 
Breakpoints tested Deflating variable 
 πt ρt it 
 Table 3 specification 
























 Table 4 specification 
























 Table 5 specification 
























 Table 6 specification 
























 Table 7 specification 
























Notes: F-statistics and the p-values (in parentheses) of the Chow tests are provided in the table. *, ** and 
*** correspond to rejection of the null hypothesis at the significance levels of 10 per cent, 5 per cent and 
1 per cent respectively. For each specification, three tests are computed. In the first test, the null 
hypothesis that no structural break exists is jointly tested for April 1994 and February 2001 over the 
whole-sample estimates. In the second test, the April 1994 structural break is tested over the pre-
November-2000 subsample. The third test considers the February 2001 break over the post-December-
1994 period. 
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IV. Discussion and concluding remarks 
1. Discussion 
In subsection III.4, the auction-based estimates suggested that the slope of 
the yield curve is negative for Turkish treasury auctions, which is repeatedly 
revealed in the whole sample, in the July 1988 to May 2001 sample and in 
the January 1995 to October 2000 sample. However, we observe a change in 
this pattern from June 2001, when the maturity variable attains a 
significantly negative coefficient estimate only when the nominal interest 
rate on auctions is deflated by the interbank interest rate to obtain the real 
interest rate. Maturity does not have a significant coefficient in the other 
regressions. At this point, it is important to summarise to what extent our 
empirical findings remain intact and where they display a pattern change. 
First of all, the findings on auction data are further supported by our 
monthly estimates in subsection III.5, regardless of the relationship 
estimated for nominal or real measures of return. That is, whether we 
estimate equation 1 or equation 2 of subsection III.3, we have revealed the 
same evidence as we had on auction data. 
Second, the between-crises subsample is the most stable episode in terms 
of the durability of empirical findings. This situation augments our views on 
the low public confidence in the governments’ debt management policies in 
Turkey for the 1995–2000 period. 
Third, the post-May-2001 sample yields a radical pattern change. In most 
cases, in the post-May-2001 episode, we observe that the real auction return 
computed by using the interbank interest rate is still negatively associated 
with maturity of debt. However, the sign of the coefficient on maturity turns 
positive in other cases, along with lower statistical significance. That is, 
people’s perception with regard to the rate of inflation and the depreciation 
of the Turkish lira must have changed after May 2001. In the light of recent 
Turkish policymaking experience, this might be intuitive. Indeed, the policy 
view of the Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey toward reducing 
inflation was formulated and has been implemented in terms of the ‘implicit 
inflation targeting’ framework and the Bank was set to an ‘independent’ 
position starting in April–May 2001. After this date, the Bank manifested its 
fundamental goal as the stability of prices. The exchange-rate regime, in the 
same episode, was set as the ‘floating exchange rate’ regime.22 Eventually, 
the changes in the public perception of inflation and currency depreciation 
can be considered as a consequence of these changes in the monetary 
policymaking framework.23 
 
22The exchange-rate regime is determined by the government, together with the Central Bank of the 
Republic of Turkey, and implemented by the Central Bank, as required by the Central Bank Law. 
23It should also be noted that the primary surplus target of the stabilisation programme started in June 
2001, which is also supported by the International Monetary Fund, helped in reducing the need to 
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2. Concluding remarks 
On the theoretical front, the further elaboration of the Alesina, Prati and 
Tabellini (1990) model, as presented in Section II and Appendix A, suggests 
a negative relationship between the treasury auction interest rates and 
auction maturity, under the assumption of a non-zero default risk and 
confidence crises. Our study provides empirical evidence from the Turkish 
economy on this relationship. We have performed our analysis through two 
types of data-sets. First, we have used a data-set that contains the data from 
each treasury auction. Second, we have used monthly data, which were 
obtained from the first data-set through aggregation. 
The finding of a downward-sloping yield curve is quite consistent with 
some specific conditions of the Turkish economy, such as chronic high and 
volatile levels of inflation, a high and volatile default risk, frequent 
occurrences of financial crisis, an inflation–devaluation cycle and the low 
credibility of policymakers, specifically until mid-2001. Due to real return 
and default risks, those conditions shape the maturity–return relationship in 
a different way from the case for developed countries. In this set-up, the low 
credibility of policymakers makes shorter auction maturities and higher 
interest rates necessary. Consequently, once the market is unable to generate 
its long-term assets, returns on treasury bills are pushed far above the 
generally prescribed levels. As far as the outcome is concerned, it can be 
argued that such management of debt is expected to be self-promoting and 
further unsustainability of debt is unavoidable. The post-May-2001 
developments should be studied in more depth in order to reach a better 
understanding of possible changes in macroeconomic fundamentals. This 
may gain feasibility over time, as more observations are accumulated. 
Appendix: The Alesina, Prati and Tabellini (1990) model 
Here, we present a formal model that reveals a negative relationship 
between the treasury auction maturity and interest rates. In order to do this, 
we employ an infinite-horizon model, based on that of Alesina, Prati and 
Tabellini (1990), which maximises a representative individual’s lifetime 
utility function and minimises the government’s loss function. 
In this model, a small economy is inhabited by an infinitely-lived 
individual who maximises her lifetime utility: 
 
generate new debt. As the expenditures of the political authority are radically restricted, the scepticism 
regarding the rollover of existing debt stock was limited after May 2001. Another important ingredient of 
the recent political climate of Turkey can be marked as the switch from a sequence of coalitional 
governments to a majority cabinet in the Grand National Assembly. These observations highlight the 
reduction of fiscal risks and political uncertainties. 
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(1) 
0
( ) for 1 0t t
t
U u cβ β
∞
=
= > >∑  
where ct denotes consumption at time t and u(·) is a regular concave utility 
function. In each period, the individual is endowed with one unit of non-
storable output and she pays a distortionary tax, τt, to the government. The 
consumer’s disposable income is given by F(τt), which is expressed as 
(2) ( ) 1 ( )t t tF fτ τ τ= − −  
where f(·) shows the distortion of tax, with f(0) = 0, f ′(·) > 0 and f ″(·) > 0. 
The convexity of f(·) allows us to capture the tax-smoothing behaviour. 
Consumers have access to perfect international capital markets in which 
they can borrow and lend at a risk-free interest rate equal to their discount 
factor, 1/β. We denote those external tax-free assets held as of the beginning 
of period t by ψt. 
There exist short-term and long-term debts with designated maturities of 
one period and two periods respectively. The utility-maximising individual 
has the following budget constraint: 
(3) 1 1 1 2 2t t t t t t t t t tc q b q bβψ + + + + ++ + +  
  1 2( ) ( ) (1 ) (1 )t t t t t t t t tF D b bτ ψ θ θ θ− −≤ + − + − + −  
where ibj denotes debt issued in period i and maturing in period j and iqj is 
the corresponding market price. D(θt) and θt are the cost of repudiation and 
the fraction of the debt repudiated at time t respectively. The default 
parameter, θt, is assumed to be the same for both types of debt maturing at 
time t. Alesina et al. (1990) assume that the cost of default is such that  
D(θt) = 0 if θt = 0 or θt–i = 1 and i > 0, and D(θt) = α otherwise.24 
The government’s budget constraint is given by 
(4) 1 2 1 1 2 2(1 ) (1 )t t t t t t t t t t t t t t tb b b q b qθ θ τ− − + + + +− + − ≤ + +  
and the no-arbitrage condition is expressed as 
 
24The timing of the events in the auction process is as follows. First, the government determines the 
maturity of the borrowings (one- versus two-period). Then it announces the prices at which it is willing to 
sell the debt, and the maximum amounts for sale for each maturity. Later, on the basis of these prices, the 
private sector chooses how much debt to buy. Finally, the government chooses the combination of τt and 
θt that satisfies the government budget constraint, given the amount of debt outstanding and the debt just 
sold. The following should hold at an equilibrium: (i) in each period and for all sequences of previous 
aggregate histories, the prices are optimal for the government, given the private sector reaction to the 
announced prices; (ii) the private sector portfolio decision is optimal, given the prices and the expected 
future equilibrium outcomes; and (iii) the choices of τt and θt are optimal for the government, given the 
private current investment decision and the effect of the current policy on the expected future equilibrium 
outcomes.  
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(5) 21 1 2 2(1 ) (1 )
e e
t t t t t tq qβ θ β θ+ + + += − = −  
where the superscript e is used to denote private expectations. 
If the government does not default in the absence of a confidence crisis, 
the discounted present value of the debt as of the beginning of period 0 is 
given by 
(6) 1 0 2 0 1 1b b b bβ− − −≡ + +  
and the optimal tax rate becomes 
(7) (1 ) * for 0,1,...t b tτ β τ= − ≡ =  










Inequality (8) implies that the government will not repudiate if the cost of 
repudiation, α, is larger than the tax distortions needed for servicing the 
debt, α .  
Now consider a confidence crisis in period t. If the private expectations, 
e
t iθ +  for i > 0, do not depend on the aggregate history of the game in previous 
periods and if et iθ +  = 1 for i > 0, then in period t the government can either 
default or repay the debt. In the first case, consumption is 
(9) 0(1 ) 1 (1 )
d
tc cβ ψ α β= − + − − ≡ , 
whereas in the latter case, taxes have to be as follows: 
(10) 1 2t t t t tb bτ − −= + ; 
(11) 1 1 1t t tbτ + − += ; 
(12) 0 for 1s s tτ = > + . 
If the government chooses to repay, consumption from t onwards is 
(13) 1 2 1 11 (1 ) (1 )[ ( ) ( )] for
R
s t t t t t t tc f b b f b s tψ β β β− − − += + − − − + + ≥ . 
Comparing the consumption figures in the two cases, we can say that the 
government chooses to repay if and only if 
(14) 1 2 1 1[ ( ) ( )]t t t t t t tf b b f bα β α− − − +≥ + + ≡ . 
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It should be clear that tα  is the counterpart of α  in the case of a confidence 
crisis. 
It can be shown that, since no debt is repaid between periods 0 and t, 
tα α>  for all t. Hence, if tα α α> ≥ , then there exists an equilibrium in 
which a confidence crisis occurs in period t or earlier. Thus tα  depends on 
the maturity structure of the public debt. 
A consequent proposition in Alesina et al. (1990) demonstrates that 
equilibrium with a confidence crisis is less likely to occur if (i) only long-
term debt is issued and (ii) the same amount of debt matures in each period. 
This is shown by minimising tα  by the choice of three borrowing variables, 
t–2bt, t–1bt and t–1bt+1, subject to a constant net present value of debt, which is 
given by 
(15) 1 2 1 1 for 0,1,...t t t t t tb b b b tβ− − − ++ + ≡ =  
The first-order conditions of this minimisation problem imply 
(16) 1 2 1 1t t t t t tb b b− − − ++ = . 
Since the maximal element, *α , is minimised when all the elements of the 
sequence tα  are minimised and since this happens when equation 16 holds 
for all t, combining equations 15 and 16 obtains t–1bt = 0 and t–2bt = t–1bt+1 for 
all t. In other words, only the two-period (i.e. long-maturity) debt must be 
issued and an equal amount of debt should mature in each period. 
If the maturity shortens, by using equations 14 and 15, tα  increases. In 
other words, the cost of tax distortions becomes higher and thus the fraction 
of the repudiated debt increases. When θt increases, by using the no-
arbitrage condition given by equation 5, it is apparent that bond price, qt, 
decreases. This reduction in bond price corresponds to an increase in the 
real interest rate on the bond. In a nutshell, Alesina et al. (1990) suggest that 
there is a negative linkage between the maturity of debt and the yield of 
bonds, the latter being the dependent variable, when tα α≥ . [A] 
Another important point in Alesina et al. (1990) concerns the risk 
premium. Supposing that 1
e
tθ +  > 0 in every period t with a known 
probability, the problem is re-treated and it is concluded that until a 
confidence crisis occurs, the government has to pay a risk premium on its 
liability to compensate for the default risk. Since tα  is lower, the risk 
premium can be reduced by lengthening and balancing the maturity structure 
of government debt. [B] 
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Results [A] and [B] together imply a drop in the real yield on bonds as 
maturity lengthens, and this has been empirically assessed using the Turkish 
data in Section III. 
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